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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A desirable solution of the problem might be obtained by means of
several slight statutory modifications, viz.:
(1) The statutes providing for testamentary disposition of one's
body to certain institutions for the rehabilitation of the maimed 18 could
be reworded so as to give a present right of disposition for similar pur-
poses to the surviving spouse or next of kin, in the absence of such testa-
mentary disposition.
(2) The statutes providing for the distribution of cadavers to medi-
cal schools' 9 could be modified so as to include a specific grant of such
bodies to medical schools for the additional purpose of obtaining material
to be used in the treatment of the living.
(3) The autopsy statutes20 could be reworded to authorize the de-
livery to public institutions for the rehabilitation of the maimed of all
parts and other material removed, upon completion of the examination,
with the written consent of the person entitled to possession of the body,
if known.
It is submitted that the enactment of such amendments would serve
not only to enhance the development of medical science in the field of
transplantation in North Carolina, but would also serve to clarify in some
measure the uncertainty in the law of this state with regard to the rights
of others in the bodies of deceased persons.
ROYAL G. SHANNONHOUSE, III.
Criminal Law-Insanity as a Defense-New Test for Determining
In the important case of Durham v. United States defendant had
been discharged from the United States Navy in 1945 at the age of
seventeen, after a psychiatric examination showed that he was mentally
unfit for Naval service because of a personality disorder.' During the
succeeding eight years he attempted suicide, was convicted of stealing
cars and passing bad checks, and was committed three different times to
mental hospitals. Two months after his third release from a mental
hospital, he was caught breaking into a house. Again he was committed
to a mental hospital. Finally, in February of 1953, he was brought to
trial in the United States District Court in the District of Columbia
in other sections of the country. From whom would the performing agency obtain
the consent where the deceased was survived by several children by two marriages
when neither wife survived him? Since consent to retention is, in effect, a dona-
tion, the statutes providing for consent to the performance of an autopsy do not
provide the answers to these questions.
"- N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-211 et seq. (1950).
20 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-7 (1953) ; N. C, GEN. STAT. §§ 90-217 et seq. (1950);
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 152-7 (6) (1952). See also N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-216.1 (Supp.
1953).
1 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
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charged with housebreaking. The only defense raised was that of in-
sanity at the time the crime was committed.
During the trial, an expert witness testified'at least four different
times that defendant was of unsound mind at the time the crime was
committed.2 Yet the trial court, without a jury, convicted accused of
housebreaking. The basis for the conviction was very simple: the ex-
pert witness would not testify to the fact that defendant did not "know"
"the difference between right and wrong in connection with governing
his own actions."3
The test applied by the district court was that set out in the cele-
brated M'Naghten case, 4 a test which has been adopted by a majority
of the states5 and the Supreme Court of the United States. 6 Many states
and the District of Columbia (until the Durham case) have added to
the right and wrong test, the irresistible impulse test.7 Yet this defend-
ant, an acknowledged mental case, received no benefit from either of
these rules in the district court. The court of appeals, however, reversed
the district court, set out a new test by which mental responsibility is to
be determined, and sent the case back for a new trial. And the court of
appeals abandoned completely the old right and wrong test which has so
long held sway over the defense of insanity in the criminal law.
Briefly, the circumstances under which. the right and wrong rule
was promulgated one hundred and twelve years ago by an English court
Id. at 866.
Id. at 868.
'8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952) ; State v. Eisenstein, 72 Ariz. 320, 235
P. 2d 1011 (1951) ; People v. Field, 108 Cal. App. 2d 496, 238 P. 2d 1052 (1951) ;
Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513 (1919) ; Griffin v. State, 208 Ga. 746, 69 S.E.
2d 192 (1952); State v. Powell, 71 Idaho 145, 227 P. 2d 582 (1951) ; State v.
Beckwith, 242 Ia. 228, 46 N. W. 2d 20 (1951) ; Fisher v. Fraser, 171 Kan. 472,
233 P. 2d 1066 (1951) ; State v. Johnston, 207 La. 161, 20 So. 2d 741 (1945) ; State
v. Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 Atl. 276 (1901) ; Taylor v. State, 187 Md. 306, 49 A. 2d
787 (1946) ; State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N. W. 638 (1935) ; McGann v.
State, 175 Miss. 320, 167 So. 53 (1938) ; State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S. W.
2d 596 (1951) ; Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166, 47 N. W. 2d 349 (1951) ; State v.
27 (1949); People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
Skaug, 63 Nev. 59, 161 P. 2d 708 (1945) ; State v. Cordasco, 2 N. J. 189, 66 A. 2d
27 (1949) ; People v. Irwin, 166 Misc. 751, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 548 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1938) ;
State v. Shackleford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1951) ; State v. Barry, 11
N. D. 428, 92 N. W. 809 (1903) ; Kobyluk v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. Rep. 73, 231
P. 2d 388 (1951) ; State v. Layton, 174 Ore. 217, 148 P. 2d 522 (1944) ; Comm. v.
Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A. 2d 276 (1949) ; State v. Gardner, 219 S. C. 97, 64 S. E.
2d 130 (1951) ; State v. Leehman, 2 S. D. 171, 49 N. W. 3 (1891) ; Gibbs v. State,
192 Tenn. 529, 241 S.W. 2d 556 (1951) ; McGee v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 639, 238
S. IV. 2d 707 (1951) ; State v. Putzell, 40 Wash. 2d 174, 242 P. 2d 180 (1952) ;
State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982 (1892) ; Simecek v. State, 243 Wis.
439, 10 N. W. 2d 161 (1943); GUTTMACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAw 403 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952); WEIHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 68, 129-173 (Buffalo: Dennis and Co.,
Inc., 1954).C Davis v. United States, 160 U. S. 469, 488 (1895).
'WEIHOFEN, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 129-173; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse As a
Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. OF PA. L. REv. 956 (1952).
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were these: M'Naghten, a paranoiac under delusions of persecution,
shot and killed the secretary to Sir Robert Peel in an attempt to kill
Peel. M'Naghten was found not guilty because of insanity. The case
aroused a great deal of public interest and debate, prompting the House
of Lords to ask the fifteen highest judges of England to state the law
governing such cases. These judges stated that in order to establish the
defense of insanity, it must be "proved to the satisfaction of the jury"
that:
"at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong."8
At the time this case was decided, Francis Gall's theory of phrenology
was the accepted view in medicine. 9 The fifteen English judges evidently
were influenced by Gall's theory' 0 for they spoke of a person suffering
from delusions "and not in other respects insane."11  Thus it would
appear that the judges had the idea that if the particular section of the
brain governing reason and logic were not unbalanced, the person was
sane and capable of committing a criminal act. It made no difference
that the person was totally insane in other sections of the brain.
The irresistible impulse rule needs little explanation, for it is exactly
what the name implies. The person compelled to commit a criminal act
by an impluse produced by a mental disease which is beyond his power
to control, may be excused from criminal responsibility.' 2 The Supreme
Court of the United States stated the irresistible impulse rule in con-
junction with the M'Naghten rule as follows:
"The term 'insanity' as used in this defence means such a per-
verted and deranged condition of the mental and moral faculties as
to render a person incapable of distinguishing between right and
' M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
' Gall declared that the brain was divided into twenty-seven different sections or
organs, each section controlling a particular trait of the person. The dominant trait
of a person depended on which section was the largest, and the size of each section
could be ascertained by studying the shape of the skull. GLUECIC, MENTAL DISORDER
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 170 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1925) ; GuTr-
MACHER AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 418 (New York: W. W. Nor-
ton and Company, Inc., 1952); WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 3-4 (Buffalo: Dennis and Co., Inc., 1954).
'0 "It seems not at all improbable that the learned judges . . . had a sentimental
weakness for phrenology." GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 170. "It is this dis-
carded fanciful brain-child of an eccentric Viennese physician of a hundred and
thirty years ago that underlies the cornerstone of our law governing the criminal
responsibility of the mentally sound." WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 4.
"M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).12U. S. ex rel. Wing v. Pennsylvania, 90 F. Supp. 208 (W. D. Penn. 1950).
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wrong, or unconscious at the time of the nature of the act he is
committing, or where, though conscious of it and able to distin-
guish between right and wrong and know that the act is wrong,
yet his will, by which I mean the governing power of his mind,
has been otherwise than voluntarily so completely destroyed that
his actions are not subject to it, but are beyond his control."' 3
By applying the irresistible impulse rule with the M'Naghten rule, the
scope of insanity sufficient to excuse a criminal act is increased.
North Carolina follows the majority of American jurisdictions in
applying the M'Naghten rule. 14  In State v. Haywood, the following
charge to the jury was called to the attention of trial court judges as
being a proper one to use:
"That if the prisoner, at the time he committed the homicide,
was in a state to comprehend his relations to other persons, the
nature of the act and its criminal character, or, in other words, if
he was conscious of doing wrong at the time he committed the
homicide, he is responsible. But if on the contrary, the prisoner
was under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish between
good and evil, and did not know what he did, he is not guilty of
any offense against the law; for guilt arises from the mind and
wicked will."' 5
Today, eighty-eight years later, this same charge or one very similar, is
still used.'0
The person compelled to commit a crime by an "irresistible impulse"
is denied the defense of insanity in North Carolina,17 for the reason stated
by Justice Bailey in State v. Brandon,
"The law does not recognize any moral power compelling one to
do what he knows is wrong .... There are many appetites and
passions which by long indulgence acquire a mastery over men
more or less strong. Some persons, indeed, deem themselves in-
capable of exerting strength of will sufficient to arrest their rule,
speak of them as irresistible, and impotently continue under their
dominion; but the law is far from excusing criminal acts com-
mitted under the impuse of such passions. . . . If the prisoner
13 Davis v. United States, 165 U. S. 373, 378 (1897).
14 State v. Shackelford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) ; State v. Hay-
wood, 61 N. C. 376 (1867) ; State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463 (1862) ; Gardner, In-
sanity As a Defense in the North Carolina Criminal Law, -30 N. C. L. REv. 4, 10
(1952).
1 State v. Haywood, supra note 14, at 377.
10 State v. Grayson, 239 N. C. 453, 80 S. E. 2d 387 (1954) ; State v. Shackleford,
232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) ; State v. Creech, 229 N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d
348 (1949).
11 State v. Shackleford, supra note 16; Gardner, sipra note 14, at 18.
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knew that what he did was wrong, the law presumes that he had
the power to resist it against all supernatural agencies and holds
him amenable to punishment."' 8
It seems that the court has given little credence to the idea that "pas-
sions" and "supernatural agencies" could overcome the power of reason
to know right from wrong. In State v. Potts, Chief Justice Smith,
writing the majority opinion, said,
"We have not allowed, as exempting from the consequences of
crime, what is called moral insanity ;E11 that is, an alleged uncon-
trollable impulse to commit an act, with the mental faculties in full
force, to comprehend its criminality and wrong. '20
A fair interpretation of this language would indicate that the court has
not been persuaded that the emotional "section" of the brain could in-
fluence the reasoning "section" of the brain; otherwise how could the
person have his "mental faculties in full force, to comprehend its crimi-
nality and wrong"?
It was stated in State v. Bracy that:
"Whatever may be his mental weakness, if a person has knowl-
edge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and will
deserve punishment whatever may be his mental weakness, he is
in the eye of the law of sound mind and memory, and subject to
punishment." 2
1
It seems a bit inconsistent to recognize a person's mental weakness in
one sentence, yet declare him to be of sound mind in the next sentence.
Therefore, a proper conclusion would seem to be that the court not
only follows the rule of M'Naghten's case, but in denying the irresistible
impulse test, follows the medical rationale on which the reasoning of
the M'Naghten case is based. The North Carolina Supreme Court
recognizes that intelligence and reasoning can be overcome only by a
"visitation of God" 22 and the defense of insanity is not available unless
reason has been overcome.23
18 State v. Brandon, 53 N. C. 463, 467-468 (1862).
" "Moral insanity" as used here means an irresistible impulse. See State v.
Terry, 173 N. C. 761, 765, 92 S. E. 154, 156 (1917).
.0 State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 465, 6 S. E. 657, 660 (1887).
21 State v. Bracy, 215 N. C. 249, 256, 1 S. E. 2d 891, 896 (1939).
_ The court does not attempt to define of what a "visitation of God" consists.
Still this phrase is repeated in many of the older cases. See State v. Journegan,
185 N. C. 700, 117 S. E. 27 (1923) ; State v. English, 164 N. C. 498, 80 S. E. 72
(1913) ; State v. Spivey, 132 N. C. 989, 43 S. E. 475 (1903).
23 State v. Grayson, 239 N. C. 453, 80 S. E. 2d 387 (1954) (defendant was an
illiterate man 26 years old. He had congenital syphilis which resulted in chronic
infection of the brain and meninges. From 1944 until 1949, except for a period
of two months, he was confined in two mental hospitals. In July of 1949 he was
[Vol. 33
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It is submitted that the medical theory on which the M'Naghten case
was based is outdated, and thus the law of the case is outdated.2 4 Francis
Gall's "section" theory of the brain has been discredited. Modem medi-
cine has shown that the brain functions as a unit.25 A disorder to any
one part of the brain is a disorder to the whole.26 An emotional disorder
can overcome the power of reason in the strongest of persons.27 Thus
the person emotionally deranged may be driven to commit a crime which
he knows to be wrong.28 Tested by the traditional application of the
right and wrong standard, this person is guilty of a crime even though
it was not an act of his free will.
29
In recent years, the right and wrong rule has been the subject of
much criticism. 30 The North Carolina Supreme Court as early as 1935
released to his mother who was to place him in another mental hospital. Tests
showed his mental age to be four years, eleven months, and he had the intelligence
quotient of an imbecile. The court reversed a conviction of murder on the ground
that there was an error in the instructions, and awarded a new trial.) ; State v.
Shackleford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) (defendant had a long record
of maladjustment in his home life, had been tried for petty larceny, drunkenness,
immoral conduct, and reckless driving, and served time for killing a man while in
service. An expert witness testified that the defendant had a psychopathic per-
sonality. Still the defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to die.) ; State
v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887) (dipsomanic convicted of murder).
2' It should be noted that some experts feel that it is not the law of the
M'Naghten Case that is outdated, but it is the interpretation of the law that is out-
dated. "[A] person who is prevented by mental disease from controlling his own
conduct cannot be said, in the true sense of the words, to 'know the nature of his
acts' and . . . he is therefore not criminally responsible under the existing law as
formulated in the M'Naghten Rules." Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
1949-1953 Report (Cmd. 8932) 80 (1953).
"2 "What is needed in the law . . . is a proper conception of the unified per-
sonality. Disease of the mind is disease of a unity. . . ." GLuECK, MENTAL Dis-
ORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 265-266 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1925) ; Notes, 40 CORNELL L. Q. 135 (1954) ; 102 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 224 (1954).
"0 "The intellect, the emotions, and the will are not disparate functions operating
in separate compartments of the brain, but are wholly interdependent, each reacting
on the other. A disorder manifesting itself in one sphere of mental activity is still
a disorder of the mind as a whole, and not merely of the one compartment."
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 10 (Buffalo: Dennis and
Co., Inc., 1954).
27 GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 21, at 312; "On the basis of undeniable and over-
whelming clinical evidence, it has been proven that human behavior is basically
emotionally conditioned and that intellectual activities are emotionally determined."
Karpman, Concepts of Law and Psychiatry, 38 J. OF CR m. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY
206, 212 (1948).
8 DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 13 (New York: The Ronald Press Com-
pany, 1952) ; GLUECK, op. cit. supra note 21 at 312; MERCIER, CRIMINAL RESPON-
SmILITY 157 (New York: Physicians and Surgeons Book Co., 1926); Keedy,
Irresistible Impulse As a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. OF PA. L. RaV. 956,
957 (1952) ; Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of
a Crime, 56 YALE L. J. 959, 975 (1947).
2 State v. Shackleford, 232 N. C. 299, 59 S. E. 2d 825 (1950) ; State v. Potts,
100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657 (1887).
"0 In a recent poll, the question of the adequacy of the M'Naghten rule was sub-
mitted to a large group of psychiatrists in the United States. Eighty per cent
stated that the rule was unsatisfactory. In a similar poll among Canadian psy-
chiatrists, ninety per cent expressed dissatisfaction. GUTTmACHER AND WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 408 (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc.,
1955]
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recognized the fact that the rule was under attack, but refused to make
any change.3 ' In 1951, the Special Committee on Crime and Psychiatry
of the North Carolina Bar Association recommended that the legal test
of insanity "should be extended to include diseases which destroy will
power and volition and the capacity to control one's conduct."8 2
The Durham case is undoubtedly a result of this criticism for it
overruled the previous tests applied in the District of Columbia. 3 The
court of appeals, in reversing the district court by a unanimous decision
discarded the old right and wrong rule, saying:
"We find that as an exclusive criterion the right-wrong test is
inadequate in that (a) it does not take sufficient account of psychic
realities and scientific knowledge, and (b) it is based upon one
symptom and so cannot validly be applied in all circumstances. '3 4
The new test to be applied by the district court on retrial is simple in its
statement:
"An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect."35,
The mental-cause rule of the Durham case is not new in the United
States. Eighty-five years ago, in State v. Pike,30 the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire affirmed a similar rule which is still followed in that
state.37 The court of appeals probably used the New Hampshire rule
1952) ; Speaking of the M'Naghten standards, Dr. Gregory Zilboorg said, "These
moralistic criteria are the expression of man's horror of the revolting act of mur-
der, but they are disguised in the formalistic, quasi-metaphysical dress of centuries
gone by, which one is asked to accept as a judicial formula of logic and law."
ZILBooRG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 17 (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1954).
31 "We are aware of the criticism of this standard by some psychiatrists and
others." State v. Jenkins, 208 N. C. 740, 741, 182 S. E. 324, 325 (1935) ; The court
repeated this statement in State v. Creech, 229, N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d 348 (1949).
'230 N. C. L. REv. 25 (1951).
"' Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
"' Id. at 874. The irresistible impulse rule was found inadequate "in that it
gives no recognition to mental illness characterized by brooding and reflection and
so relegates acts caused by such illness to the application of the inadequate right-
wrong test." Id. at 874.
" Id. at 875. This test is now the sole legal test for insanity in criminal cases
in the District of Columbia, for the circuit court of appeals denied a rehearing en
banc on September 10, 1954, and the time limit for filing a writ of certiorari ex-
pired October 10, 1954. In the subsequent case of Stewart v. United States, 214
F. 2d 879 (D. C. Cir. 1954), the new test was held to be applicable.
"' The trial court of New Hampshire instructed the jury, "that whether there
is such a mental diseases as dipsomania, and whether defendant had that disease,
and whether the killing ... was the product of such disease, were questions of fact
for the jury." The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed this instruction.
49 N. H. 399, 407-408 (1870).
" The events preceding the New Hampshire case show that particular attention
was given to its decision. Chief Justice Doe had voluminous correspondence with
Dr. Issac Ray, a leading forensic psychiatrist, concerning responsibility of a men-
tally disordered person. See: Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Col-
laboration in the Jurisprudence of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L. REv. 183 (1953).
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in formulating its own, for it said, "The rule . . . is not unlike that
followed by the New Hampshire court since 1870. ' '38
The application of the rule by the court presents no great problem.
The court of appeals' proposed charge to the jury3 9 suggests the pro-
cedure applicable. Evidence is received concerning the mental disease4"
or the mental defect.41 This will, of course, include the use of expert
witnesses. It is then left to the jury to determine (a) if the defendant
had a mental disease or mental defect, and (b) if the criminal act was
"caused" by the mental disease or defect. The jury must find both for
insanity to be a good defense. The application of the rule is somewhat
similar to that applied in tort cases where negligence is involved.4
2
The function of the expert witness is to describe the mental condition
of the accused. No longer does he have to pass upon the very issue of
insanity by testifying to the ability of the defendant to distinguish right
from wrong.43 The issue of insanity must be determined by the jury
from the evidence before it, as it properly should be. This also leaves
the psychiatrist free to use the terminology of his profession rather than
to try to interpret his diagnoses into legal terms.
Nor is there any greater chance that the defendant can feign insanity
under this mental-cause rule. For there are the same two safe-guards
provided: the expert witness and the jury. Under the right and wrong
rule, the testimony of the expert witness, in effect, decides the outcome
of the insanity issue as was demonstrated in the Durham case at the trial
in the district court. Under the new rule, the expert witness testifies
only as to mental condition and the jury determines the issue of respon-
sibility. Thus, if one does not catch the pretense, the other should.
The Durham case represents an attempt to get away from a legal
"8 Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 874 (1954).
" "If you the jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not
suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition at the time he committed
the criminal act charged, you may find him guilty. If you believe he was suffering
from a diseased or defective mental condition when he committed the act, but believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not the product of such mental abnor-
mality, you may find him guilty. Unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt
either that he was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition, or
that the act was not the product of such abnormality, you must find the accused
not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus your task would not be completed upon
finding, if you did find, that the accused suffered from a mental disease or defect.
He would still be responsible for his unlawful act if there was no causal connection
between such mental abnormality and the act. These questions must be determined
by you from the facts which you find to be fairly deducible from the testimony and
the evidence in this case." Id. at 875.
"' "We use 'disease' in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of
either improving or deteriorating." Ibid.
" "We use 'defect' in the sense of a condition which is not considered capable
of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either congenital, or the
result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease." Ibid.
"-'Henderson v. Henderson, 239 N. C. 484, 490, 80 S. E. 2d 383, 385 (1954),
which states law of proximate cause for negligence.
" STANSBURY, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF EVIDENCE 238.
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definition of insanity. The authorities in the field of psychiatry concede
that insanity cannot be defined.44 The attempts of the courts to reach a
legal definition of that state of mental disorder which renders a crime
excusable have met with some difficulties because of the different inter-
pretations of the terminology used and the difficulty of translating medi-
cal testimony into the legal terms used in the tests. The Durham case
presents no standard to which the court may point and attempt to com-
pare with the mind of the defendant. It is unnecessary under this test
for the expert witness to attempt to translate the terms of his profession
into legal concepts.
Perhaps the Durham case also represents a more humanitarian ap-
proach to the problem of the mentally disordered criminal, for rehabili-
tation rather than punishment could be stressed under this rule.4 5 Take,
for example, the person with a psychopathic personality. He is able to
distinguish right from wrong, but has no control over his will due to
emotional instability. He lives for the present, not the future, and any
present impulse will control over the threat of possible punishment in
the future.40  The court of appeals speaks of the type of "mental illness
characterized by brooding and reflection.1 47  That is the person who
knows that society has declared an act to be wrong, but after much de-
liberation decides in his warped manner of thinking that it is better to
commit the wrong act.
It would serve no useful purpose to send this type of mentally ill
prisoner off to prison to become even more unbalanced and antisocial.
An eminent psychiatrist has said,
"The belief that society serves the common and individual good
by a system of rigid punishment has never been fully justified by
history, and its persistence looks more and more like supersition
than conviction based on fact."14 8
" GUTTMACHER AND WEIEOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 419-420 (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1952).
" A finding of insanity by the jury would not result in the complete discharge of
the prisoner, instead he should be committed to a hospital for treatment. This
would entail having available adequate facilities and personnel to accommodate such
patients. Unfortunately North Carolina appears unwilling to provide adequately
for the criminally insane as was demonstrated by the recent defeat of H. P_ 48 deal-
ing with sexual psychopaths. Lack of facilities to handle those committed under the
proposed statute would seem to be the reason for its defeat.
" WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 23 (Buffalo: Dennis
and Co., Inc., 1954).
" Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862, 874 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
"8 Dr. Zilboorg believes that society is too concerned with the idea of seeking
revenge against the violator of the law. He agrees that a criminal should be pun-
ished for his crimes when punishment would be effective, but in the case of mentally
ill prisoners, punishment has little or no effect as a deterrent of future crimes.
ZILBOORG, THE PSYcHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT 97 (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1954); "Punishment, in such instances, is
not useful as a means of dissuading the offender from repeating his unlawful act.
." Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 378, 379 (1952).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A program of rehabilitation based on psychiatric treatment could cure
the accused in many cases, and by doing this, more serious crimes in
the future would be prevented. It is society, not the defendant, which
will receive the chief benefits from this rule.
In a dissenting opinion in a case in the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, there was a statement suggestive of
the North Carolina situation,
"The rule of M'Naghten's case was created by decision. Perhaps
it is not too much to think that it may be altered by the same
means.1
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THOMAS G. NALL.
Criminal Law-Improper Court Response to Spontaneous Jury
Inquiry as to Pardon and Parole Possibilities
Does a jury which has "unbridled discretion" to recommend life
imprisonment in a capital case have a right to consider what effect
parole and pardon may have upon that sentence? North Carolina first
answered this question in State v. Dockery,' where a private prosecutor
referred to parole possibilities in his argument before the jury. In
reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that such argument
was prejudicial and directly in conflict with the 1949 statutory proviso
which granted to juries the right to recommend life imprisonment in
capital cases.2  Recently, in State v. Conner,3 the problem arose in a
different manner. Here, the jury spontaneously returned to the court
room after having deliberated for some time, and one of the jurors asked
the court the following question: "Will the defendant be eligible for
parole if given life imprisonment?" The court replied without elabora-
tion, "Gentlemen, I cannot answer that question." The supreme court
held that the presiding judge was correct in refraining from commenting
on defendant's eligibility for parole, because such matters are deemed
in law to be irrelevant to the issues involved in the case and prejudicial
to the accused. The court granted a new trial, however, on the ground
that once such a question was propounded, it became the duty of the
presiding judge to positively charge the jury to put the question and
matters relating thereto out of their minds.
The courts have long been divided as to the permissibility of an
explanation, in response to queries from the jury, of the possible effect of
"United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 568 (3rd Cir. 1951). The dissentingjudges were Biggs, McLaughlin, and Staley.
1 238 N. C. 222, 77 S. E. 2d 664 (1953).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953). The 1949 proviso referred to above by the
court was added to this section by the 1949 Session Laws of North Carolina, Chap-
ter 299, section 1.
241 N. C. 468, 85 S. E. 2d 584 (1955).
19551
